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This article presents and explores the axioms and core ideas, or idées-
force, of the Fascist ideologies of the first third of the twentieth century. The 
aim is to identify the features that define the term “Classical Fascism” as a 
conceptual category in the study of politics and to uncover the core ideas of 
its political theory1. This is important, because the indiscriminate use of the 
tag “Fascism” in recent years has left the term practically devoid of 
meaning: if everything is Fascism, then nothing is Fascism. 
The study starts out from a set of premises, some of them 
methodological and others historiographical. The methodological 
perspective I will adopt will assume that any political ideology or theory has 
a series of elements that form the nucleus of its thought. This nucleus can 
be described and analysed, and it can be distinguished from other 
collateral or peripheral elements that may complement it2. At the same time, 
this analysis requires an appraisal of both the idées-force themselves and 
the political use that is made of them; to arrive at a sound definition of 
Classical Fascism I must explore both the protagonists’ ideas and their 
actions. 
As for the controversial historiographical aspects of the phenomenon, I 
think it is fair to speak of a generic Fascism, as the late Tim Mason did in 
1988. Establishing the similarities between the various forms of the 
movement will highlight their differences. The volunteers of the 
International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) declared that 
they were “off to fight Fascism” with little heed for whether the enemies 
they would face were an amalgam of radical conservatives, Fascistoid 
authoritarians, traditionalists and genuine or opportunistic Fascists rallied 
around the banner of an preventive anti-democratic counter-revolution 
blessed by the Spanish church as a “crusade”.  
I will start by proposing a generic model of Classical Fascism, based 
on a comparison of three frequently cited definitions of the movement, all 
highly regarded in academic circles. Their explanatory power in fact is all 
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the greater if we see them holistically and investigate the ways in which 
they complement each other. 
Robert O. Paxton:  
“Fascism may be defined as a form of political behaviour marked by 
obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or 
victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which 
a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy 
but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic 
liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal 
restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion” (Paxton, 
2005: 218). 
Roger Griffin: 
“Fascism should be seen as a revolutionary form of nationalism guided by 
the myth of the imminent rebirth of the nation in decadence” (Griffin, 2002). 
Norberto Bobbio: 
“Fascism is a political system which aims to unite a society in crisis inside a 
dynamic and tragic dimension promoting the mobilization of the masses by 
equating social and national demand” (Bobbio, 1981). 
In my comparison of these three definitions I will pay particular 
attention to the following points: the political and social situation at the time 
that Fascism took hold: the Fascists’ diagnosis of that situation; the general 
objectives of the distinct branches of the movement; the idée-forces of how 
these objectives should be attained and, finally, the strategies used to 
achieve them. Bringing all these elements together will help us to 
understand the implementation of the idées-force and prototypical 
behaviours of Classical Fascism. I will then test the model by comparing 
and analysing it in the light of texts written by four Fascist leaders from the 
inter-war period in Europe. 
Broadly speaking, the Fascist diagnosis indicates the existence of a 
crisis (of enormous proportions, viz. Bobbio) which has plunged the 
nation/community into decline (viz. Paxton and Griffin); the situation can 
only be redressed by palingenesis, or rebirth (Griffin). The idée-force of 
how to achieve this sacred objective is the establishment of a united 
society in accordance with the totalitarian premises of the movement 
(Bobbio). The strategy is to adopt a revolutionary (and eclectic) form of 
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nationalism (Griffin) which equates social and national demands (Bobbio) 
and which eventually leads to the establishment of an empire, and to 
propose an ideological, political and cultural alternative to democratic 
freedoms (Paxton). The tactics used to achieve these aims would include 
the formation of alliances with traditional elites, the systematic, rationalized 
use of violence in an amoral and paralegal form, mass mobilization 
according to an integralist, sacralized conception of politics (Bobbio) and 
internal cleansing and external expansion (Paxton). 
If these appreciations are correct, Classical Fascism is characterized 
by a set of ideological and political aims and methods in which ideas, 
attitudes and behaviours are determined by an anti-democratic palingenetic 
ultranationalism underpinned by a sacralized ideology3; the quest for a 
united, indissoluble society as a political system and, at the same time, the 
collective myth that mobilizes and redeems the nation; and third, violence 
as a political vehicle4 applied unchecked against internal opposition and 
against external enemies who challenge the nation’s progression towards 
the dream of rebirth and the culmination of this progression in the form of 
an empire.  
These factors lie at the heart of Fascist ideology. Other elements, 
important but questions of form rather than of substance, should be 
mentioned in passing but are not central to our theme. Examples are the 
predominance of the State over the Party, in the case of Italy, or the 
predominance of the Party over the State in the case of Germany; ruralism, 
which holds that the essence of the Fatherland resides not in the 
“degenerate” cities but in the countryside (as well as in the army) –or the 
insistence on the aesthetic of politics, that is, the paraphernalia that 
accompanies it. Though we will not explore them further here, these three 
factors have an undeniable importance in the tactical ideas of the Fascists. 
Indeed, from the point of view of the political philosophy of Fascism the 
aesthetic of politics is an ontological factor that legitimates the Fascist 
Weltanschauung, by providing a metaphysical and aesthetic context for the 
rebirth of the Fatherland5: a pure, beautiful essence (be it spiritual or 
biological) that the enemies of the nation, the enemies of authenticity, do 
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not allow to achieve its fullest expression. So the unitary rebirth of the 
Fatherland requires, inevitably and inexorably, the application of systematic, 
rationalized violence to counter or eliminate this opposition.  
In the following sections I will test these hypotheses through an 
appraisal of texts written by Fascist leaders in different European countries: 
Primo de Rivera in Spain, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and 
Codreanu in Romania. Following the analytical schema used above, 
though with a greater attention to conceptual detail, my comparison will 
focus on the writings of these ideologues and explore their diagnosis of the 
situation, the fundamental aims they establish for individuals and social 
groups, their vision of the State, their understanding of the terms society 
and nation, the role they attribute to violence in politics, their identification 
of internal and external enemies, and, in general, the strategies they 
propose for fulfilling these objectives. 
Crisis and the desire for rebirth 
The comparison of the texts of these leaders6 (complemented on 
occasion by other Fascist texts) highlights an underlying, common idea: 
against a background of profound national decline, the political response of 
Fascism is regarded as necessary and inevitable. These thinkers see this 
decline (which had its own idiosyncrasies in each national setting, but also 
a set of common characteristics) as a manifestation of a widespread crisis 
in Europe and the West in the first third of the twentieth century: the crisis 
of the political system, values and society brought into being by the French 
Revolution. According to Mussolini, Italian Fascism represents a new dawn, 
the categorical and definitive antithesis of the world of democracy, 
plutocracy and masonry –in a nutshell, the end of the world of the principles 
of 1789 (Mussolini, 1984: 226).  
José Antonio Primo de Rivera began his famous speech to mark the 
constitution of the Spanish Falange in 1933 by dismissing Rousseau and 
his theory of the social contract as “shameful” and referring repeatedly to 
the “failure” of the parliamentary system. In the following years he declared 
that parliamentarianism was on its knees and had led the country to a 
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situation of increasingly “pestilent decomposition” (Textos, 1959: 225). In 
Spain as in the rest of Europe, the liberal-capitalist system was on its 
deathbed (Textos, 1959: 11); Christian civilization itself was at risk (Textos, 
1959: 838) Spain was in “moral ruin”, in a world split into factions of all 
kinds (Hernández, 1992: 15).  
To put an end to the chaos of the times, say the Fascists, we must first 
understand its causes, the root of the evil, and the disasters that beset the 
continent under the hegemony of the trilogy “Liberty, Equality and 
Fraternity”. In his account of Italian Fascism, Goebbels praises Mussolini 
for showing the world how to act in a revolutionary way, how to dismantle 
the essence of Marxism and how to triumph over liberalism. In successive 
paragraphs, he analyses liberalism as an ideological trend and a set of 
mobilizing myths which, since its beginnings in 1789, has (in his words) 
inundated nations one by one, submerging them in a series of revolutionary 
convulsions which have now come to their inevitable end: the “swamp” of 
Marxism, democracy, anarchy, and the class struggle. For Goebbels the 
Communist revolution was the culmination of a series of errors, the most 
terrible of the world’s catastrophes7. 
For his part, the Romanian Fascist leader Codreanu affirmed that the 
State based on the old ideology of the French Revolution was on the way 
to “ruin” (Codreanu, 2005: 44) and denounced the corruption of those he 
called “political dabblers” (idem: 31). Hitler stated his conviction that 
parliamentary politics was one of the manifestations of the “decadence of 
Humanity” (Hitler, Mi Lucha: 30) and declared that the theoretical 
pronouncements of Fascist ideology aimed to replace the trilogy of 1789 
with a new political system based on “authority, order and justice” (Alvial, 
1938: 89). This new trilogy was similar to the one favoured by the Duce: 
“order, discipline and hierarchy” were the key social values, to be imposed 
with “a firm hand” by Fascism in order to save society from plunging 
headlong into “chaos and ruin”. Primo de Rivera expressed a similar 
ideological position, stating that a man is free only when he belongs to a 
strong, free nation characterized by “authority, hierarchy and order” (del 
Aguila, 1982: 206). 
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To face this situation of crisis the political priority is palingenesis, the 
rebirth of the Fatherland. To quote the Romanian Fascist leader Codreanu: 
a “powerful, flourishing” Fatherland, a new Romania to create a new man, a 
true elite, and a country like the “sacred sun in the sky and a beautiful, rich 
land”; the Legionaries are called by God, after centuries of darkness and 
abuse, to “sound the trumpet of the resurrection of the Romanian race” 
(Codreanu, 2005: 3, 4, 5, 6). After a long night of centuries, he writes, 
Romanians await the dawn, the moment of their “resurrection as a people” 
(idem: 45). 
For Mussolini, both in the early stages of Italian Fascism between 1920 
and 1922 and in the years of power, the raison d’être of Fascism was to 
safeguard the moral and material grandeur of the Italian people and to play 
a part in the salvation of the Fatherland, a generic objective to which on 
many occasions he pledged his loyalty (Mussolini, 1984: 303). 
In explaining the program of the Movement (the Falange de las 
J.O.N.S) in November 1934, Primo de Rivera repeated one of his core 
ideas –the belief that strengthening and elevating the “supreme reality of 
Spain” was the urgent task of all Spaniards (Hernández, 1992: 121). And if 
the greatness of the Fatherland is the overriding objective, then decisive 
action by true patriots is essential, “a disciplined, convinced minority” able 
to become the “implacable axis” of Spanish life on which the “Spanish 
resurgence” will be built (Textos, 1959: 416). 
The palingenetic objectives of these Fascist leaders find their echo in 
Hitler’s speeches and writings. When he declared the 25 points of the 
Party’s program to patriots, he said, “a fire was enkindled from whose 
glowing heat the sword would be fashioned which would restore freedom to 
the German Siegfried and breathe new life into the German nation” (Hitler, 
Mi Lucha: 122).  
Metaphysics and the cult of the Fatherland: the spiritual 
revolution 
Transcendental spirituality is a key issue in the Classical Fascist 
movements. It creates a cohesive society, breaking down class barriers 
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and fostering an ideological attitude to life among the militants; it 
compensates for the lack of sophisticated theoretical and ideological 
schema and legitimates any behaviour, however brutal or amoral. The core 
of this spirituality is the Fatherland, Fascism’s supreme value. 
Ultranationalistic patriotism is a cult with its rituals and martyrs, an unofficial 
church8. Fascism is a sacralized ideology that fills the gap left by the 
gradual de-Christianization of the continent9. It is a “religious concept”, 
according to the 1933 edition of the Italian Encyclopaedia. Hitler confessed 
to his inner circle in 1941 that in the long term “it will be impossible for 
national socialism and religion to live together” because, as he explains at 
a later date, “Christianity is an invention of sick brains” (Hitler’s Table Talk, 
2000, pp. 118-119). 
On many occasions Mussolini claimed that Italian Fascism was a party, 
a regime, a faith, even a religion. He conceived it as a religious 
phenomenon of vast historical proportions, the product of the Italian race 
(Mussolini, 1984: 318). In a similar, if not identical vein, Primo de Rivera 
affirms that man must have something to believe in: Fascism is born to 
establish a new faith, “neither right-wing nor left-wing”. It is “collective, 
integrating, national”, a new civil faith able to create a strong, hard-working, 
united Spain (Textos, 1959: 45). 
This civil religion10 and spirituality, for Codreanu, allow the new man 
and the new nation to achieve a great spiritual revolution for the benefit of 
the entire people (Codreanu, 2005: 44). Rosenberg says much the same in 
1934, when he declares that the revolution of the politics and the State is 
complete, but that the rebirth of the spirit and the soul has just begun. For 
Mussolini the starting point is the belief that the Fatherland is not an illusion, 
but the greatest, the most human, “the purest of realities” (Mussolini, 1984: 
52) –an idealized, deified Fatherland, the lynchpin of Fascist doctrine and 
propaganda.  
Fascism capitalizes on the nineteenth-century process of nationalizing 
the masses, a key element in the construction of Europe’s liberal societies, 
and adds to it a conception of the Nation as an eternal entity, outside time, 
transgressing social divides and political ideas. Nevertheless, since the 
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materialization of this idea of the Fatherland faces many obstacles, its 
proponents resort to metaphysical and poetic metaphors when they invoke 
it –making politics aesthetics11, as we saw above. Those who wish to play 
their part in the sacred mission of regeneration must identify with an 
irrational, metaphysical conception of the Nation. 
But this irrationality was in fact highly rational and political; crucially, it 
had to unite traditionally antagonistic forces inside the same inspirational 
movement. Financial and industrial powerhouses such as March in Spain, 
Agnelli in Italy and Krupp in Germany had to identify with the same goal as 
the workers in their factories, the Italian landowners of the Po Valley, 
Tuscany and the rest of Europe with the labourers in their fields, the 
owners of the huge new department stores with the small shopkeepers, the 
middle classes and the workers with the powerful elites. All this took place 
in the context of a widespread crisis, characterized by social conflict and by 
the relentless criticism –from both the left and the right– of liberal political 
institutions, many of which proved totally incapable of finding solutions to 
the problems their countries faced. 
The rebirth of the Fatherland is a versatile, cross-sectional message, at 
once a call to arms and a powerful drug that could adapt itself to a variety 
of economic, social and political interests. This was the reason for its 
relative success in pre-Second World War Europe. It was the spark 
(carefully designed, pragmatic, and opportune) that ignited the powder-keg 
in a historical context which, in the words of many contemporaries, was 
best characterized by the term “despair”12.  
Various social scientists have stressed the importance of this 
desperation in the rise to power of the Fascist movements13. Hitler himself 
declared, in 1942, that “it was the German nation’s despair that gave birth 
to National Socialism” (Hitler’s Table Talk, 2000: 259). The transcendental 
nature of the Fatherland in this context is summarized by Primo de Rivera’s 
claim that the militants in his movement joined him in loving the “eternal 
and unshakeable metaphysic of the Fatherland” (Textos, 1959: 559) and 
believed in the “supreme reality of Spain” (Hernández, 1992: 121).  
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This is the core of the Fascist ideologies: the conception of the Nation 
as an integrated whole. Primo de Rivera himself defines this conception 
well when he states that Fascism is not violence but unity, not a tactic, but 
an idea. For him, Fascism holds that there is something above parties and 
above classes, “something of a permanent, transcendental, supreme 
nature”, which exists as a distinct, superior reality, and which has its own 
ends Puntos Iniciales (Textos, 1959: 85): the historical unit known as the 
Patria. The Spanish Fascist leader sees in this conception14 the most 
profound feature of his movement, the idea of a united destiny, the Patria 
or Fatherland (Textos, 1959: 189). 
Fascist propaganda presented the movement as a vehicle of national 
regeneration attuned to the true essence of the Nation and whose supreme 
mission was to rekindle the most profound energies of the entire society. 
These movements of salvation are above and beyond the stale theories of 
the left and the right intent on disintegrating society and above personal 
interests as well. The patriotic cult of the Nation is the balm that soothes all 
wounds, ends all political, ideological and social discord (…) and 
legitimates and justifies the use of radical methods against opponents and 
enemies both at home and abroad in order to attain the goals proposed. 
The figure of the undisputed Fascist leader is also legitimated by the 
metaphysical, essentialist nature of the Fatherland. The Head of the Nation 
is the infallible interpreter15 of the Community’s essence, needs, and 
destiny. At the same time, the Nation is the source of his power and his 
heavy burden, as the official propaganda describes it: he is a servant, an 
instrument of the Regenerated Nation. 
With these premises, the socio-economic theories of the Fascists 
constituted a radical reflection of a hierarchical conception of society. Each 
member was a part of the national jigsaw, from the worker at the bottom to 
the businessman at the top. Fascism’s breaks with the past were spiritual 
rather than economic or social16. The key factor in the link between political 
theory and practice was the conviction that the total concentration of power 
by the Fascist government would place the economy at the service of 
politics. In 1937 Mussolini declared that in Fascist Italy capital was at the 
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orders of the State (Mussolini, 1984: 157). In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote that 
the mission of the State with respect to capital was relatively 
straightforward: the only important thing to ensure was that capital should 
be at the service of the State in order to foster “an independent national 
economy” (Hitler, Mi Lucha: 76). 
Primo de Rivera, in 1935, declared that the Patria was a unit with a 
universal destiny and that the individual was the bearer of a particular 
mission inside the harmonious whole of the State. There were to be no 
disputes; the State cannot fail in its task, nor can the individual renounce 
his in the “perfect order” of the life of his nation (Textos, 1959: 477). 
This is the Fascist Idea: an ultranationalist, palingenetic and violent 
totalitarianism17, a novel and radical political solution for the burning 
problems of European society of the early twentieth century. Though 
Europe’s radical right tested other models (for instance, the Franco and 
Salazar regimes in the Iberian peninsular) Fascism proved the most 
successful political alternative for confronting the problems of the mass 
industrial societies of the period. Raising the banner of extreme nationalism 
and rejecting the liberal law-based State, it militarized society, controlling it, 
mobilizing it and preparing it for two tasks: on the one hand, for the brutal 
elimination of its opponents and of those disqualified from membership of 
the nation, and on the other, for foreign wars of conquest to create the 
empire18.  
The leader of Romanian Fascists puts it simply: the Legion affirms that 
above all personal interests is the Fatherland and its demands (Codreanu, 
2005: 62). Rosenberg, the obscure Baltic ideologue of the Nazi party, 
declared that the Nazis believed that whatever metaphysical position one 
adopts with regard to questions of “the here and now and the beyond”, in 
this world one can do no more than develop the supreme and most noble 
values and place oneself at the service of the “German whole”, at the 
service of a single idea19: “the eternal Germany!” (Rosemberg/Goebbels, 
1996: 20). 
With objectives as noble and selfless as these, all the means that the 
new Fascist society may use are justified, even those that might classify it 
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as totalitarian once in power: the submission of the private to the public 
sphere, the repression of individual and collective rights and freedoms, the 
suppression of the rule of law, the mass organization of the society in 
Fascist movements and parties, and its militarization. This totalitarianism is 
applied in direct proportion to the status of the members of the community; 
the higher one’s rank in society, the higher one’s level of autonomy. The 
individual is diluted in the national community, and therefore, his rights, his 
freedom, his fulfilment as a human being, are conferred on him by his 
belonging to the community or race. Gentile, possibly the most 
representative thinker of Fascist Italy, declared that Fascism is idealist, that 
it supports faith and celebrates the ideal values of the family, the 
Fatherland, civilization, and the human spirit as superior to any contingent 
value. He proclaims “sacrifice and soldiery”, urging the individual to be 
ready to die for a reality that transcends him (Gentile, 1929: 58). In the 
Fascist utopia, the State has become the conscience and the will of the 
people. To quote Hitler: “one must never accept that the authority of the 
State and the authority of the party are two different things. The control of a 
people and the control of a State must be combined in the same person” 
(Hitler’s Table Talk, 2000: 174). 
The Unity of the Community as a formula for political salvation 
The cult of the Fatherland, spiritual revolution, a civil religion, sacrifice 
without limits, a glorious death. This cult of the Fatherland has a central 
dogma: the unity of the National Community. As we noted above, this is the 
core concept of Fascist political theory, doctrine and propaganda. Primo de 
Rivera summarizes it well, saying that the principal tenet of the “new faith 
that burns in Spain” is that a people is a “whole, indivisible, living” entity, 
with a universal destiny to fulfil. Collective interests must prevail over 
individual ones; no just individual interest is alien to the interests of the 
community (Textos, 1959: 237). On numerous occasions in his writings and 
speeches Prim states that all the aspirations of the new States can be 
subsumed in one word: “Unity”. This is his most deeply-held belief: the 
Patria is a historical unit with a universal destiny, in which all its members 
 13
merge together to form something that is greater than each one of the 
social groups. The fundamental aim of the State is to place itself at the 
service of this great unit, establishing “a regime of national solidarity and 
spirited, fraternal cooperation” (idem: 40). 
This is the Idea, the myth, the illusion. Fascist movements and regimes 
used the belief in this idea as the benchmark against which to judge, 
reward or punish members of the society. A manual for Hitler Youth 
members proclaims that a young man who marches with this movement is 
not a mere number among millions but the soldier of an idea; his value to 
the community is measured by the extent to which he has grasped this idea 
and made it his own (Hernández, 1992: 209).  
All that supports the idea of the rebirth of the Fatherland is encouraged, 
and all that challenges it must be countered or eliminated. This applies to 
institutions, laws, culture, ideas, parties, trade unions, or at an individual 
level, to attitudes and behaviours. 
The believers in the new faith, the forerunners of the Fascist idea of 
the New Man, must be the guides and the driving force behind this rebirth: 
to quote Mussolini, the “dynamo”. Codreanu says that all the Legionaries 
will have a unified mind and spirit and must therefore have a sole leader 
(Codreanu, 2005: 17). The National Socialists sought to create a 
Volksgemeinschaft, a people’s community cleansed of “anti-Germans”. 
In Classical Fascism action predominates over thought and attitude 
and vitality over theory. Military values, and the brutal experience of a 
generation of First World War veterans20, were transferred to the terrain of 
ultranationalist politics. The party militant was replaced –on the theoretical 
level or, once in power, de facto– by the armed militiaman21 of the Party-
Community-State. 
Nevertheless, though the unity of the community is the cornerstone of 
Fascist ideology and propaganda, we should not forget that where Fascist 
movements came to power they did so thanks to a broad coalition of forces 
of the radical right. The Fascist movements themselves were a 
conglomerate of individuals and factions with a set of common elements 
but with distinctive features of their own22. In the Europe of the early 
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twentieth century, both left and right were highly fractured. One of the 
indisputable political achievements of both Hitler and Mussolini in Fascism, 
and of Franco in the realm of the Fascistoid military dictatorships, was to 
have succeeded in bringing together a wide variety of factions under a 
single command (and later, under a single regime). The three managed to 
establish the lowest common denominator (ideology and political action)23 
that the political forces and individuals of the non-democratic radical right 
were willing to accept against the common enemy.  
The historical study of this broad conglomerate of the radical right has 
stressed the important role in the Fascists’ attainment of power (and, once 
in power, in their consolidation) played by the powerful economic sectors, 
the army, the Establishment and the Church. Scholars define this alliance 
as an “authoritarian compromise” (Burrin, 1998), a counterrevolutionary 
alliance or a “preventive counterrevolution” (Bobbio, 1972). Whether or not 
they gained control of the political process, Fascist movements played a 
decisive role in this “authoritarian compromise” intent on bringing down the 
liberal rule of law. Where they gained political control, we can speak of 
Fascist regimes in the true sense, whereas if their role was important but 
subordinate (as in Franco’s Spain) another term should be found to 
describe the regime (Saz, 2003: 54), (Saz, 2002: 162), (Griffin, 1993: 120). 
As we will see in the following section, it turned out that Fascist political 
projects went much further than those of their partners in the 
counterrevolutionary alliance; not content with destroying the liberal State 
and crushing the left, they sought to mobilize the masses and impose their 
imperialist dream. Fascism was not only a novel technique for social and 
political control, but an ideological project that was at the same time 
conservative and anti-conservative, and for this reason so hard to classify 
and understand.  
The Fascists’ political goals went far beyond those of the radical 
conservatives in Europe at the time, who were frightened by the 
consequences of the revolution of 1917. At the height of the Spanish Civil 
War in 1937, José Pemartín presented his vision of Fascism in Qué es lo 
Nuevo, describing the movement as a novel and effective technique at the 
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service of traditionalism, destined to rid the Patria of its enemies within and 
to achieve a harmonious balance between tradition and modernity. For 
Pemartin, Fascism was an excellent method for organizing the masses, 
able to restore discipline in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the 
providential military leader: 
“(…) unrelenting work, rigid discipline (…) all these just prerogatives 
that the capitalist businessman must have over his workers to ensure high 
productivity, order and discipline in the company, will be preserved in all 
their vigour (…) a form of feudalism, in the highest sense of the word (…)” 
(Pemartin, 1937: 325). 
The drive for Empire. The Community in arms against its 
opponents and enemies at home and abroad 
For these Fascist leaders, the regenerated nation demonstrates its 
vitality in its capacity for conquest and its ability to submit other spiritually or 
racially inferior peoples. Imperialism is the cornerstone of Fascist discourse 
and practice and demands the maximum possible mobilization24 of the 
society to be able to carry out its plans for conquest25. These two features, 
mobilization of the society as a unit and the drive for empire, distinguish 
Fascism from other authoritarian models of the era however murderous 
and however influenced by this new movement they may have been. Unlike 
Fascist regimes, classic civilian or military dictatorships such as the Franco 
regime in Spain promoted the maximum depoliticization of civil society (with 
the exception of the militants and functionaries when the single parties are 
formed). 
These Fascist empires had a dual dimension: spiritual and military. 
Indeed, the two facets fed off each other. Mussolini, proclaiming the Fascist 
dream of reviving Imperial Rome, defined the Fascist State as a wish for 
“power and empire”. In Fascist doctrine the empire was not only a territorial, 
military or mercantile expression, but a “spiritual and moral” one as well 
(Mussolini, 1984: 66). In Spain, Primo de Rivera rejected out of hand the 
anti-war pronouncements of the Constitution of the Spanish Second 
Republic (during which he was a particularly critical member of parliament) 
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and stated his belief that empire represents the “fullest historical expression 
of a people” (Textos, 1959: 651); his Movement expresses its “desire for 
Empire” (del Aguila, 1982: 208). He also declared that the idea of Spain is 
justified by an imperial vocation to unite languages, races and customs in a 
“universal destiny” (Textos, 1959: 384). 
This Fascist destiny of empire and conquest, the highest possible 
fulfilment of the nation, will be achieved when the Nation/Community has 
attained spiritual unity and when all the forces that once divided it have 
been neutralized politically, culturally, socially and economically. So the 
action of the movement to save the Fatherland must be revolutionary, 
radical, merciless. This is his reasoning: a strong State, a State that is sure 
of its raison d’être, deals “inexorably” (to quote Primo) with those who hold 
opposing, incompatible views (del Aguila, 1982: 230). 
Similarly, Goebbels sees the revolution is a dynamic process that 
possesses its own legality, both before and after the attainment of power. 
The means used to achieve this end are of no consequence. In the 
characterization of revolution the means, either “violent or legal”, are 
irrelevant (141). All that matters is that the movement should become a 
Volkspartei or people’s party26. 
Political violence and the cult of war are two manifestations of an anti-
bourgeois, militaristic Fascist Dasein which sees life in terms of combat. On 
the sacred altar of Fatherland no sacrifice is too great –not even life itself. 
Patriots must play their part in the national project, adopting the attitude of 
loyal soldiers who unflinchingly obey their commanders’ orders. This is the 
way to achieve power and to unite society with its imperial destiny. Political, 
economic and social discord will fade away.  
In 1934, before the invasion of Abyssinia, Mussolini proclaimed that 
the Italian nation was in “a permanent state of war” (Mussolini, 1984: 53), 
and that Italy was becoming a “military warrior society”, characterized by 
the virtues of obedience, sacrifice, and submission to the Fatherland. The 
entire life of the nation –political, economic and spiritual– was to be geared 
towards the satisfaction of military needs (idem: 56). On another occasion 
the Duce declared that when the cannon sounds it is the voice of the Patria 
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one hears and the only choice for the true patriot is “to stand to attention” 
(idem: 54). 
Like Primo de Rivera, Mussolini was a staunch anti-pacifist, a Fascist 
who believed that war was an “inevitable” consequence of the conflict 
between peoples and ideologies. Everlasting peace was neither possible 
nor desirable. Pacifism establishes a “renunciation of the struggle, 
cowardice in the face of sacrifice”; only war brings all human energies to 
their “maximum degree of tension” and leaves the imprint of nobility on 
those who engage in it. War is the ultimate test of a man, a situation of life 
or death. For the Duce war is a natural phenomenon, the “supreme court of 
judgment”; it represents for men what motherhood represents for women 
(Mussolini, 1984: 29). 
So for Mussolini life is ontologically “struggle, risk, tenacity” (idem: 301). 
For Primo de Rivera, of a similar if not identical mentality, war is 
“inalienable”, “absolutely necessary and inevitable”. Man feels it “intuitively 
and atavistically”; war will be in the future what it was in the past (del Aguila, 
1982: 225). 
And if for the Fascists war is as inexorable as it is necessary, the army 
is the guardian of the essence of the Fatherland and its idiosyncrasies and 
virtues the best example for the believers and members of the New Society. 
Primo de Rivera declares that the army is the strongest and healthiest 
guarantee of the Spanish essence (Textos, 1959: 565). For Hitler, the 
German people owes “everything” to the army: where civilian life is 
“saturated with greed and materialism”, the army educates the people 
towards an ideal, towards devotion to the Fatherland and its greatness 
(Hitler, Mi Lucha: 99). 
This aggressive, militaristic mentality characterizes all areas of political 
activity. Violence, as we will see, is an essential component of Fascism, not 
only as a basic tactical instrument, but as a part of the Fascist conception 




The Fascist Weltanschauung: social Darwinist harmony with 
nature, and the overcoming of antagonistic forces 
For Fascists, as Mussolini says, struggle is the origin of all things 
because life is full of conflict. The essence of human existence will always 
be struggle, like a “supreme fatality” (Mussolini, 1984: 247); life is a 
“continuous combat” (idem: 250). He goes so far as to claim that for 
Fascists “the struggle itself is even more important than triumph” (idem: 80). 
Combat is a lifestyle, a way of understanding the world and how to live in it, 
characterized by bravery, duty and discipline27. For his part, Codreanu 
affirms that the Legion seeks to restore in combat all the “creative energies” 
of the Romanian community (Codreanu, 2005: 106). 
This mentality and the attitudes and behaviour that derive from it is a 
necessary condition for leading the Fatherland towards its highest state: 
Empire. With this social Darwinist vision of the world, Fascists see struggle 
as part and parcel of nature –struggle between individuals, groups and 
nations28. For Mussolini, there are peoples marching towards the horizon, 
peoples that stagnate, and peoples that die (Mussolini, 1984: 127).  
Victory is for the strongest. Nations that triumph on the battle field win 
the right to lead the world; their will for power has imposed itself. Hitler 
recalls that in his “struggle for existence” in Vienna he decided that social 
action can never consist in a “ridiculous and useless lyricism of charity” 
(Hitler, Mi Lucha: 13). Nature, he continues, knows no political frontiers; it 
places new creatures on the globe and contemplates the free play of forces 
acting on them. Those that win through, due to their “impetus and 
character”, are granted the “supreme right to existence” (idem: 51). 
Following this social Darwinist line, Mussolini proposes that Fascist 
Italy should seek “supremacy over land, over sea, in the air, in matter and 
in spirit” (idem: 77). Hitler, with his specifically racist convictions, claimed 
that in the distant future humanity will demand that a “master race”, 
supported by the forces of the entire planet, will take on the “leadership of 
the world” (Hernández, 1992: 159). 
Fascism holds that inequality between human beings is as natural a 
phenomenon as the power and vitality of the struggle itself. For Mussolini 
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nature is the “realm of inequality” (Mussolini, 1984: 127) and Fascism 
affirms the “irremediable, fecund and beneficent” inequality of men (idem: 
90). Nature’s laws are inexorable and to try to oppose them is pointless: 
Nature is unequal and amoral; only the fittest survive, in an aristocratic 
hierarchy of individuals and nations. The protagonists of history are the 
nations, and each one should be governed and led by an elite and a leader 
able to interpret its true spirit and guide the community towards the 
fulfilment of its destiny. So man in the Fascist conception is aggressive, 
unequal, hierarchical, and territorial29. 
Hitler summarized these ontological principles clearly in his statements 
on the subject (especially in the ones that reveal his profound hatred) when 
he states that the Jewish doctrine of Marxism rejects the “aristocratic 
principle of nature” and values more highly the dead weight of numbers and 
the masses than strength and vigour. In his monologues of 1941, he asks 
“is it we who created nature, established its laws? Things are as they are 
and we do nothing to change them (…) All that is very right and proper, for 
it is the struggle for existence that produces the selection of the fittest” 
(Hitler’s Table Talk, 2000: 132).  
For Martin Bormann, one of the defining features of Nazism was the 
will of the militants to live as naturally as possible, in accordance with “the 
laws of nature and the laws of life” (Hernández, 1992: 232). 
The National Socialist radicalization of Fascist conceptions30 highlights 
the key role of social Darwinist tenets in their thinking. In Mein Kampf, Hitler 
has no qualms in stating “the masses are no more than a part of nature; 
what the masses want is the triumph of the fittest, and the destruction of 
the weak or his unconditional submission” (Hitler, Mi Lucha: 115).  
The hallmark of this attitude to life is the struggle for the glorious rebirth 
of an imperial Fatherland able to resolve all the problems, eliminate all 
contradictions, and unite rival forces. In January 1926 the French Fascist 
George Valois wrote in Le Nouveau Siècle that the great originality of 
Fascism lay in its fusion of two great tendencies, nationalism and socialism. 
Whereas the opposition between nationalism and socialism seemed 
insurmountable inside the framework of parliamentary systems, Fascism 
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was able to break down this opposition by bringing both ideologies into a 
single national and social movement, as we suggested at the start of this 
article.  
This firm desire to harmonize previously antagonistic forces became a 
key factor in Fascist ideals, propaganda and methods. In their bid to unify 
the Nation, anything that could be of use was exploited. Fascism’s political, 
cultural and spiritual revolution aimed to reconcile tradition and modernity, 
rationality and irrationality, technology and spirituality, individuality and 
community, the elites and the masses, the maximum concentration of 
power and political participation of the masses, romanticism and classicism, 
science and metaphysics, trade unions and management, populism and 
aristocratism, conservatism and anti-conservatism, legal and paralegal 
political action, revolution and order, capitalism and anti-capitalism; 
socialism and anti-socialism. This extraordinary combination was the direct 
product of its palingenetic messianism31, raising the banner of the Nation 
united at last, and of the Fascists’ tactical positioning (neither on the right 
nor on the left) which cut straight across party politics, ideology, economics 
and society. 
The breadth of its range meant that Fascism was able to appeal to all 
social groups. Its combination of ambiguity and demagogy allowed it to 
adjust its discourse to the expectations of the sector of society that it was 
addressing at any given moment: for the workers, anti-capitalism; for 
industry, anti-communism; and for the middle classes, a blend of the two. 
The falangista Agustín del Rio Cisneros, compiler of Primo de Rivera’s 
works, saw Spanish Fascism’s attempt to solve the capitalism-communism 
dichotomy as a “synthesis of tradition and modernity” able to provide a 
response to the needs of the time (Textos, 1959: 77). Writing in Il Popolo 
de Italia in March 1921, Mussolini declared that Fascists were able to 
reconcile and overcome antitheses that overwhelmed others. Fascists 
could be both “aristocratic and democratic”, “conservative and progressive”; 
“reactionary and revolutionary”, “legal and anti-legal”, according to the 
circumstances of the time and place, that is, according to the historical 
circumstances.  
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The attempt to engage the entire nation in a single political movement 
required the surmounting of (some of) these antagonisms and the 
mobilization of society along ideological lines. The masses were needed to 
carry out the political projects of social control and empire. Social 
heterogeneity, economic and social inequalities and the differences in 
autonomy according to social status were all concealed beneath a veil of 
extreme patriotism. As Hitler claimed jokingly in 1942: “another loyal 
supporter was little Neuner, Ludendorff’s valet. There were also noblemen 
(…) I realized the similarity of opposites” (Hitler’s Table Talk, 2000: 219). 
The rebirth of the Fatherland is the sacred objective and individuals, by 
forming part of the project, occupy the place assigned to them in the 
organic community. No sacrifice is too great. Politics becomes a sacred 
essence, faith replaces reason, the attitude to life replaces debate and 
political adversaries are not opponents to be persuaded but enemies to be 
removed. 
Conclusions 
The analysis of these Fascist texts seems to support the validity of the 
model established at the start of this article. The intrinsic properties of 
Classical Fascism comprise a set of palingenetic ultranationalist ideals 
based on a conception of an antidemocratic, sacralized and totalitarian 
political position ready to use any means and to pay any price to impose its 
will32.  
The revival of a Fatherland in decline (in a context of profound crisis 
and despair in among many sectors of the population, above all the middle 
classes) will be achieved by the creation of a heterogeneous national mass 
movement33 which cuts across ideological, economic and social factors and 
culminates eventually in the unity of the community. The Nation thus 
recovers its true essence and power, its purity and its destiny. Finally we 
should stress the importance of violence in the Fascist Weltanschauung: 
violence and its most noble expression, war, which accelerates events and 
empowers individuals, the Fascist movement, and the community. Since 
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internal and external enemies alike impede the coming into being of the 
Fatherland, violence will inevitably be used against them34.  
This rebirth of the Fatherland and the achievement of unity and 
harmony justifies everything, even violence of all kinds: society may use 
ruthless means to rid itself of its enemies at home and prepare for war with 
those abroad. Everything that opposes the palingenesis of the National 
Community must be annihilated. 
The populist mobilization of the community35, both before and after the 
rise to power, will provide answers for the social and national demands. 
The enemies of this project of total domination inside the national borders 
and the creation of an empire abroad will be the victims of an implacable, 
systematic, rationalized, murderous violence with no respect for moral or 
legal concerns. This was the object of the radical European right in its 
Fascist period: to destroy the classical nineteenth-century liberal model and 
to enable the regenerated Fatherland to create, out of nothing, a cohesive 
set of societies in a Europe beset with divisions and conflicts in the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. 
The theoretical premises of Fascism and the action of Mussolini’s and 
Hitler’s regimes would miraculously resolve all the contradictions and 
harmonize society’s antagonistic forces. The ideas of ultranationalism, 
social Darwinism, capitalism36 and Fascist nihilism fell on fertile ground 
especially in places where social, economic and political malaise was 
compounded by the deep national wounds37, for instance the Germany and 
Italy after the First World War. The economic, social, political crisis of the 
time created a political vacuum (the most obvious example being Germany 
after the Crash of 1929) which the Fascists were able to fill by offering 
national adaptations of a novel political formula that was revolutionary, 
spiritual, youthful and modern but at the same time traditional and 
respectful of economic and social structures, and thus appealing to the 
conservative sectors38.  
Fascism created a new cocktail out of well-known ingredients. Its 
composition could be adapted to the moment and the situation. Three of 
these ingredients were essential complements to the core ideas described 
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at the start of this article, and provided the system with a consistent 
ideological basis. First, its vision of man and nature; second, the totalitarian 
logic of the implementation in the social and political domain39 of the sum of 
the ideas and practices of followers and militants (in parallel to a merciless 
repression of any dissidence) and, finally, the imposition of a political 
method of social control or a radical new right-wing political formula free of 
any ethical or legal restraints and which alternated the use of legal and 
illegal means as the situation of the moment demanded. This political 
formula imposed itself successfully in Germany and Italy in the Europe of 
the inter-war period and, significantly, was only defeated by a massive 
external military effort, aided by a much less important (and in the case of 
Germany, practically non-existent) internal resistance. 
These political criteria and this Weltanschauung derive from the 
Fascist conception of man. In order to live in harmony with themselves and 
with the laws of nature men must acknowledge their aggressiveness, their 
inherent inequality, the need for hierarchy and territory, and must spurn all 
empathy towards the opponents or enemies of the Fatherland.  
This Fascist ideology and the political practices of Hitler’s and 
Mussolini’s regimes represented a radical right-wing alternative to liberal 
modernity40 by offering solutions for the sources of anguish, alienation and 
misery that afflicted the societies of Europe in the interwar years. The 
desperate exacerbation of contradictions of all kinds gave a legitimacy to 
the Fascists’ proposals: the inexorable erosion of the traditions and religion 
that had underpinned pre-industrial societies; the atomization and 
alienation of the individual in the liberal mass societies; the growing social, 
political and economic divisions; hypermaterialism, in parallel to the loss of 
spirituality and transcendence; the bickering of party politics, leading at 
times to a loss of perspective on vital national issues; the economic and 
political chaos of the class struggle; apathy, widespread despair; the 
political and social neglect of ex-combatants, the middle classes and the 
young; the sensation of spiritual or racial decadence; the threat of 
communist revolution; the loss of political direction in societies wracked by 
multiple parallel crises (especially political) and in which the classical liberal 
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model of the nineteenth century in many cases had lost its legitimacy and 
its capacity to provide solutions to the new problems of the mass society of 
the twentieth century. 
Against this background of widespread crisis and despair, Fascist 
ideologies offered responses. This was one of the reasons for the evident 
political fascination that they exerted across many sectors of the European 
population: the national community against individualism; the creation of a 
harmonious and organic whole in place of social, political and economic 
discord; resolute, effective decision-making by strong leadership in place of 
wishy-washy pluralism and parliamentarianism; aggressive militarism to 
redress the loss of political direction; ultranationalism as against Marxist 
universalism; a concrete idea of the Fatherland as against an abstract idea 
of Humanity; transcendental  spirituality as against self-centred materialism; 
sacrifice in place of corruption; aristocratic values in place of bourgeois 
mediocrity; irrationalist vitalism versus Enlightenment and positivism; 
Nietzsche41 versus Kant and Marx. 
Moving from the world of ideology to the world of action, the defining 
features of Classical Fascism are the predominance of the political over the 
economic and of the public over the private42; the respect for capitalism as 
a productive system and the maintenance of a class-based social structure; 
selective murder to combat spiritual or racial decadence and to secure 
territorial expansion; the totalitarian Fascistization and militarization of all 
levels of society, which was particularly intense at the lower levels; and, 
finally, the desire for an Empire and the single-minded determination to 






1. Political theory is understood as the analysis of political ideas in relation to 
political processes. 
2. This is what Seliguer (Seliguer, 1970) terms the fundamental nucleus of an 
ideology, as distinct from the operative nucleus, and what Freeden (Freeden, 
1994) calls the uneliminable nucleus, in contrast to the adjacent or peripheral 
nuclei, and other authors core ideas (Antón, 2006). 
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3. On this subject, see (Gentile, 2004: 19). 
4. For Michael Mann: “Fascism is the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing 
nation-statism through paramilitarism” (Mann, 2004: 13). 
5. I owe this important distinction to Prof. Ferran Gallego (UAB). 
6. “In all Fascist movements so far, the personality of the leader had played a 
crucial role” (Laqueur, 1996: 35). 
7. A Fascist manual of the times expressed this explicitly: “(…) the universal 
values of Fascism: anti-Marxism, anti-democracy and anti-parliamentarianism; 
nationalism; political firmness/intransigence; spirituality; a desire for action; the 
cult of the superman and of the elites; authoritarian government; hierarchy and 
discipline” (Alvial, 1938: 46). 
8. See (Griffin, 2005). 
9. “Fascism, in the last resort, was based upon nationalism as a civil religion, and 
its aesthetic articulated this faith just as it did for the older established 
religions” (Mosse, 1996: 251). 
10. According to a contemporary observer: “Fascism is more, far more, than a 
simple political and social conception. It has an ascetic element of renunciation 
and sacrifice; a sense of spiritual sublimation, so intense and profound that it 
goes beyond the normal party programs, enthusiasms and passions that 
political struggles arouse, to reach the rank of a true civil religion, with its faith, 
its dogmas, its orthodoxy, its rites, its martyrs and its otherworldly aspirations 
and ideals” (Alvial, 1938: 71). 
11. For Walter Benjamin, Fascism meant the introduction of aesthetics into political 
life (Benjamin, 1973). 
12. See (Dimitrov, 1976: 49) and (Neumann, 1942: 49). 
13. “Comparison suggests that Fascist success in reaching power varies less with 
the brilliance of Fascist intellectuals and the qualities of Fascist chiefs than 
with the depth of crisis and the desperation of potential allies” (Paxton, 2005: 
115). “Fascist movements can come to power under two conditions. The first is 
that the bosses –the owners of large industry, the judges, the army chiefs– are 
in despair” (Bambery, 1998: 295). 
14. (…) Fascist movements have not merely played the card of an aggressive, 
expansionist, imperialist nationalism, but that of the national unity (a more 
ambiguous and complex role) –Mussolini as the successor of Garibaldi, Hitler 
of Bismarck. which had a profound influence on their popular impact” 
(Poulantzas, 1978). 
15. “Mussolini is always right” was one of the most popular slogans spread by the 
Duce’s propaganda service. 
16. “Once in power, Fascist regimes banned strikes, dissolved independent labour 
unions, lowered wage earners’ purchasing power, and showered money on 
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armaments industries, to the immense satisfaction of employers” (Paxton, 
2005: 10). 
17. As a distant echo, reminiscent of a particular political culture, the campaign 
slogan of the leader of the Radical French right Le Pen in the Presidential 
Elections of 2007 was “Tous ensemble, relevons notre France”. 
18. “Fascism was overtly nationalistic, militaristic, and expansionist” (Laqueur, 
1996: 15). 
19. “Ideological thinking orders the facts into an absolutely logical procedure which 
starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything from it; 
that is to say, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm 
of reality” (Arendt, 1967: 471). 
20. “The Fascist theory of the prelude to war was influenced by the understanding 
that war could mobilize the entire nation. The First World War created this 
reality” (Mann, 2004: 81). 
21. For example, Italian males aged between 16 and 18 who joined the Fascist 
youth organization were called “the machine-gun bearing vanguard”. 
22. Clearly, in the NSDAP Georg Strasser sought different things from Röhm or 
Himmler, see Gallego (2006); the same was true of Primo de Rivera and 
Ledesma Ramos in Spain, see Gallego (2005). On the plurality of Italian 
Fascism, see Buchignani (2006).  
23. “Ideology is an important aspect (though not the only one) and is itself a 
process in construction, closely related to social, political and even institutional 
dynamics” (Saz, 2003: 54). 
24. “(…) Fascism was a populist, “radical” movement, with a strong push “from the 
bottom up” (Mann, 2006: 66). 
25. “Constructed on the idea of the decadence, degeneration and death of the 
Fatherland, Falangist ultranationalism was built on the palingenetic myth of 
unlimited regeneration and resurgence of this same Fatherland. (…) the myth 
of the revolution and the “desire for Empire”, also essential in themselves, 
constituted the vital complement of the palingenetic myth” (Saz, 2003: 404). 
26. “Fascism attracted support from different groups at different times, but recent 
historiography has tended to conclude that in the crucial pre-power phase 
Fascism, especially in Germany, attracted a remarkably eclectic following in 
terms of class, ideology and motivation” (Eatwell, 1992: 168). 
27. The Enciclopedia Italiana of the time defines Fascism thus: “It conceives life as 
struggle”. 
28. “Fascism is ‘true’ insofar as it helps fulfil the destiny of a chosen race or people 
or blood, locked with other peoples in a Darwinian struggle, and not in the light 
of some abstract and universal reason” (Paxton, 2005: 16). 
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29. “But even Fascism in the smaller countries was militaristic, ultranationalist, and 
aggressive to the best of its limited ability. It is tempting to speculate what for 
instance, relations between a Fascist Britain and France, or Nazi Germany and 
a Fascist France, would have been. Their interests would have collided, and 
they would not have coexisted in peace” (Laqueur, 1996: 71). 
30. See (Gallego, 2004). 
31. “(…) Fascism was itself a secular religion with a sense of messianic mission 
(…) (Laqueur, 1996: 45). 
32. “A Fascist regime could imprison, despoil, and even kill its inhabitants at will 
and without limitation (Paxton, 2005: 142). 
33. “(…) it was not enough to don a coloured shirt, march about, and beat up 
some local minority to conjure up the success of a Hitler or a Mussolini. It took 
a comparable crisis, a comparable opening of political space, comparable skill 
at alliance building, and comparable cooperation from existing elites” (Paxton, 
2005: 75). 
34. Michael Mann identifies five key characteristics of Fascism: nationalism, 
statism, transcendence, cleansing and paramilitarism (Mann, 2004). 
35. “No regime was authentically fascist without a popular movement that helped it 
achieve power, monopolized political activity, and played a major role in public 
life after power with its parallel organizations” (Paxton, 2005: 154). 
36. “As long as capitalists lent their authoritarian work organizations to Nazi goals, 
Hitler allowed them to reap the profits. If they resisted, he smashed them. 
Capitalism as private property did not interest him. Capitalism as disciplined, 
authoritarian production did” (Mann, 2004: 153). 
37. “Fascism may be best understood, therefore, as primarily a counterrevolution 
ideological project, constituting a new kind of popular coalition in the specific 
circumstances of an interwar crisis (…) national humiliation and enraged by the 
advance of the left” (Eley, 1983: 81). 
38. (…) Fascism offered a new recipe for governing with popular support but 
without any sharing of power with the left, and without any threat to 
conservative social and economic privileges and political dominance” (Paxton, 
2005: 104). Romania was the exception: the dominant classes eventually 
murdered the most important leaders of the Iron Guard.  
39. The Nazis called this “Gleichschaltung”: the synchronization of all the aspects 
of the life of the society with the ideology and the political goals of the Party. 
(Macridis, 1998: 199). 
40. This view, shared by several scholars of Fascism, is defined by Richard Griffin 
as the “new consensus”: “The core component of this conceptual framework 
can be summarized as the premise that Fascism is an ideologically driven 
attempt by a movement or regime to create a new type of post-liberal national-
community which will be the vehicle for the comprehensive transformation of 
society and culture, with the effect of creating an alternative modernity” (Griffin, 
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2005: 9). For Michael Mann, it is “(…) the darkside of modernity” (Mann, 2004); 
a resacralized (Gentile, 1996) or reactionary modernity (Herf, 1990). 
41. See de Mayer (1986), especially the chapter on Nietzsche and social 
Darwinism; also the chapter “Power and anti-egalitarianism in Nietzsche and 
Hitler” in Tugendhat (2002). 
42. In 1937 Robert Ley, leader of the German Work Front, declared 
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